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Environmentalism ultimately demands a global per-
spective. The concepts of finitude and interdependence,
absolutely fundamental to environmental analysis, are
confirmed in the recognition of the global environment
as an essentially closed system.1 Any less encompassing
analytic framework undermines, to some extent, the cen-
tral proposition that all levels of the natural system
are fundamentally intertwined. Admittedly overused, the
image of "Spaceship Earth" nonetheless powerfully illus-
trates both that the planet is a discrete, and hence
finite, entity and that its occupants cannot escape the
consequences of their activity.
Concluding that the entire globe is an ultimately
appropriate analytic framework does not, however, sim-
plify current environmental issues or decisions. Their
scientific irrelevance notwithstanding, national bound-
aries and the other political facts, including the power
and wealth of individual nation-states, cannot be ig-
nored. It is as presumptuous and counterproductive
for environmental scientists to deny the power and
importance of human political associations as for poli-
ticians to ignore fundamental physical laws. The
* Earlier drafts of parts of this book have appeared at 2
Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 32 (1975) and 82 Yale L.J, 1659 (1973).
t B.A. Williams College, 1978; J.D. Candidate, Yale Law
School.
1. The system is not entirely closed, however. It critically
depends on the input of solar radiation, especially in the forms of
light and heat.
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goals of environmental decisionmaking are inherently
political. Thus even from a global perspective, environ-
mental decisions must inevitably take political relation-
ships into consideration.
At any level of political organization, environmen-
tal policymakers confront formidable problems. Even in
situations in which authority relationships are stable
and clearly defined, environmental policy decisions in-
volve the integration of information from several dis-
ciplines. Few decisionmakers are familiar with the con-
cepts and analytical assumptions of such diverse fields
as biology, economics, epidemiology, politics, statis-
tics, chemistry, and law. Yet it is clear that compe-
tence in these and other disciplines is essential to en-
sure the quality of environmental decisions. 2 At the
international level, these complexities are compounded
by the lack of a central political authority with ef-
fective coercive power. The international environmental
policymaker's tasks are even more difficult than those
of his national counterpart.
In this context, World public order of the environ-
ment3 is a welcome addition to the literature on environ-
mental law and politics, for it begins to integrate the
multitude of analytic methods and information sources
necessary in order more rationally to "take account of
the ecological dimension to [international] political
choices."?4 The book is a solid and valuable initial step
toward the development of a system "to protect the human
environment in the calculable future[.]"s
Throughout her book, Dr. Schneider demonstrates
familiarity with the principal sources in this new and
largely unorganized intellectual field. Her general
theory of international environmental organization is
developed with specific reference to several of the most
pressing global environmental issues. Woven through the
broader discussion are treatments of the Law of the Sea
2. See B. Ackerman, S. Rose-Ackerman, J. Sawyer & D. Hender-
son, The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (1974).
3. J. Schneider, World public order of the environment: To-
wards an international ecological law and organization (1979) [here-





Conference and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization (IMCO) agreements on oil pollution
that, in themselves, represent useful syntheses of sub-
stantial and diverse bodies of information. Though
organized around the concepts of inclusive and exclu-
sive claims to resources, 6 Chapter 3, "Concepts of in-
ternational and environmental law," includes concise
summaries of activity in several of the substantively
important areas of environmental law: air pollution,
anadromous fish species, uses of outer space, Antarctica,
international rivers, exclusive economic zones, and
private remedies for transfrontier pollution. By inte-
grating this empirical material into her argument for
the proferred analytic framework, Dr. Schneider makes
her book more accessible and, ultimately, more informa-
tive than if it had remained entirely theoretical.
I. The Theory of Delegation
As has been suggested, the decentralization of ef-
fective power within the international system compounds
the complexity of environmental decisionmaking. Dr.
Schneider confronts the absence of central coercive in-
stitutions and nonetheless contends "that this interna-
tional system can, without centralized coercion, be ren-
dered more ecologically responsive in the future." 7 In
place of coercion by the central community, 8 she
6. Pp. 22, 30-31. Inclusive resources are defined to be
those over which the world community justifiably asserts jurisdic-
tion because the primary impacts of activities involving those re-
sources will be international. Inclusive resources, best exempli-
fied by the world's oceans, are considered to be 'the common heri-
tage of mankind,' p. 29, and, consequently, to require consulta-
tion of the world community in establishing their proper use. Ex-
clusive resources are those over which individual nation-states or
private parties may exercise unique ("exclusive") jurisdiction be-
cause they will capture both the costs and benefits of exercising
that control. For the traditional formulations of the concepts of
inclusive and exclusive interests, see p. 10.
7. P. 6.
8. In this review, the term "central community," borrowed
from Dr. Schneider, will be used to include authoritative repre-
sentatives of the world community, particularly the U.N., its
branches and organizations and other widely recognized authorita-
tive bodies carrying out legislative, executive, or judicial
functions.
1 Sq8C]
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suggests "that the authority to coerce be delegated to
states whose self-interests are compatible with common
environmental interests. The public good--environmen-
tal protection and preservation--may thus be achieved
as a result or by-product of activities undertaken by
states in their own national interest." 9 As an illus-
tration of this point, the author notes that interna-
tional marine pollution agreements have recently tend-
ed toward authorizing coastal states--the frequent vic-
tims of "vessel-source" pollution--to enforce stan-
dards and take jurisdiction over damages actions.1 0 She
argues that "[t]he creation of [these] new alternative
enforcement jurisdictions is intended ... to see that
those states which have particular or exclusive incen-
tives compatible with more inclusive common interna-
tional interests have the means to pursue them and con-
sequently benefit humanity as a whole. 11
The idea of delegating authority is certainly at-
tractive. It seems partially to solve the free rider
problem associated with the production of public goods.
In an unregulated system, actors who might well bene-
fit from producing a public good may nonetheless re-
frain from doing so. Their decision will be influenced
by the possibility of some other actor bearing the cost
of production and allowing the first party to enjoy the
public good at no cost whatsoever.1 2 There are two
situations in which the free rider tendency can be
overcome and some measure of public goods produced by
self-interested actors. The first is a situation in




12. Thus, for example, the potential members of a labor
union can all agree that it would benefit each of them to organize.
Yet despite recognizing the desirability of that goal, none will
have an incentive to incur the costs in time, money, and effort of
actually undertaking to organize the others. In the environmental
context, a coastal state might conceivably capture enough of the
benefits of enforcing ocean dumping standards to merit incurring
the costs of doing so, but it could even better further its inter-
ests if some other nation would enforce the standards and provide
the same benefit which, by definition, would be available to all.
13. It should be evident that the "small group exception"
does not require that only one member of the affected group supply
the good. Coalitions of two or more "costbearers" could apportion
costs and available benefits among themselves in such a way as to
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will provide the good. Actors who have no opportunity
to be free riders may decide that they "would be better
off if the collective good were provided, even if they
had to pay the entire costs of providing it themselves,
than they would be if it were not provided."14 This
situation is most likely to occur in small groups with
members of unequal power. Such groups will tend to
minimize information and organization costs and to maxi-
mize the chance that the preeminent members will be
able to appropriate to themselves a sufficient, albeit
incomplete, fraction of the benefits associated with the
collective good to merit their incurring the entire cost
of producing it.15
The second situation in which private costbearers
may be induced to provide public goods is where "side
payments" are made to overcome an actor's reluctance to
incur costs. A party may be induced to become the cost-
bearer by being granted benefits over and above the
share of the public good he will be able to capture for
himself.1 6  Side payments do not necessarily compensate
for the cost of providing the good; they simply overcome
a potential beneficiary's inclination to refrain from
producing on the chance of becoming a free rider.
Dr. Schneider suggests that international environ-
13. (Continued)
fall within the exception. Obviously, however, as the number of
members of the coalition increases, the transactions costs of find-
ing one another and of ascertaining that none can reasonably expect
to be a free rider will also increase steeply.
The term "costbearers" will be used to describe self-inter-
ested actors who, for whatever reason, incur the costs of producing
a collective good the benefit of which they cannot effectively deny
to their counterparts--"free riders" or "non-costbearers."
14. N. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 34 (2d ed.,
1971).
15. Id. at 27-29, 33-35. See p. 12 for Dr. Schneider's
summary of this point.
16. To continue with the traditional example of the labor
union, the individual incurring the expense of actually organizing
others would not only participate in the collective good of higher
wages, but would also receive the "side payment" of being made a
union officer. Officership would distinguish this individual and
give him more money, better work conditions, or, perhaps, simply
more prestige. In the environmental case, the coastal state would
not only benefit from reduced ocean pollution, but might be per-
mitted to collect certain fines from violators of the international
dumping standards.
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mental public goods can often be producedl7 by self-
interested nation-states and proposes that, where self-
interested activity does produce a public benefit the
central community should authorize such activity.1 8
Delegating coercive authority represents a side payment
to the costbearing nation-state. Schneider's theory,
however, acknowledges that, despite authorization, the
level of environmental protection provided by a nation-
state will be dictated by the goals, costs, and bene-
fits of that nation-state. From the point of view of
the central community, self-interested nation-states
will produce suboptimal quantities of public goods.19
Moreover, self-interested nation-states will be indif-
ferent to the distribution of the public good. The in-
terests of free riders will have no bearing on cost-
bearers' decisions as to levels of environmental pro,
tection or preservation. From the perspective of the
costbearer, this is wholly legitimate; free riders bear
no costs, do not contribute to the production of the
public good, and so have no right to participate in pro-
duction decisions. From the perspective of the central
community, however, there are no members of the bene-
fited community who are not also costbearers. That is
precisely the consequence of the global perspective.
Whereas the costbearer regards the portion of the pub-
lic benefit that it cannot capture to be an externality,20
within the global system, there are no externalities,
17. The word "production" tends to connote active synthetic
effort on the part of the producer. It should be noted in passing
that, particularly in the field of environmental protection, main-
taining a certain condition or refraining from development may
equally redound to the general welfare. All these possibilities
are contemplated in the use of the verb "to produce."
18. P. 14.
19. P. 16. Dr. Schneider acknowledges that public goods
will be produced at suboptimal levels. She accepts the "second
best" nature of her proposed solution. Such second best solutions
may, however, represent substantial improvements over the current
global situation and may be the best achievable solutions in the
context of decentralized global power. While second best solu-
tions should not be rejected out of hand, it will be suggested in
this review that the costs and causes of this suboptimal public
goods production should be more carefully explored before whole-
heartedly adopting Dr. Schneider's approach.
20. Briefly, a positive externality is an "action taken by
an economic unit [which] results in uncompensated benefits to
others." E. Mansfield, Microeconomics 450-51 C2d ed, 1975). A
negative externality would be a similar action which resulted in
uncompensated costs rather than benefits.
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either positive or negative. Dr. Schneider contemplates
environmental public goods produced by self-interested
costbearers. But their activity is directed at inclu-
sive resources. 21 Each nation-state member of the world
community has, by definition, a legitimate interest in
the disposition of the resources being exploited or pre-
served and in the benefits of that exploitation or pre-
servation. The costs of production may not be shared
equally, but each nation-state has a proprietary inter-
est in the inclusive resources being exploited or pro-
tected; none is a free rider.2 2
Before it delegates coercive authority to individ-
ual nation-states with interests divergent from its own,
the central community should be convinced of the value,
from its perspective, of the benefits provided. Evalu-
ating the act of authorization solely according to the
total level of environmental benefits produced ignores
important aspects of the function and value of the act
itself. Authorization by the central community, parti-
cularly in the context of jurisdiction over inclusive
resources, has normative consequences that should be
seriously considered before recommending a theory of
delegation. Dr. Schneider, it should be noted, is not
wholly unaware of these factors, 2 3 but she underempha-
sizes their importance in deciding to which occasions
and factual situations her theory is most appropriately
applied. Careful analysis should allow one to decide
with more precision which classes of environmental prob-
lems are amenable to delegation of authoritative control
to a particular nation-state and what the costs to the
world community of such a delegation are likely to be.
Authorization by the central community may not in
any way enhance the power of an individual nation-state
to provide environmental goods or protect environmental
values, but it will legitimate the exercise of that
power. Given that purely self-interested nation-states
will produce suboptimal amounts of public goods and
will consider only their own goals in determining the
level of a good that will be produced,24 it is problematic,
21. See note 6 supra.
22. Thus, it should be noted from this point, that the
terms "costbearer" and "non-costbearer" are only relative. For the
sake of consistency, they will continue to be used, but "costbearer"
should be read as "principal costbearer."
23. See, e.g., p. 108.
24. See note 19 supra.
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at the least, for the central community to authorize
such purely self-interested activity.
The legitimacy of the central community rests in
large measure on its representativeness of the world
community, the formally equal members of which are na-
tion-states. Much of its authority resides in the con-
sensus or at least majority will of those members.
Though it is undisputed that the world system is char-
acterized by inequalities of effective power, it is
equally clear that it is founded on a normative princi-
ple of fundamental political equality. ThAt norm re-
quires that the central community concern itself not
only with producing the greatest total benefit, but al-
so with the way in which that benefit is produced and
distributed. Decisionmakers of the central community
should balance all three factors before delegating coer-
cive authority to a particular nation-state. Dr.
Schneider implicitly recognizes the broad responsibili-
ty of central community decisionmakers, 2 5 but she stops
short of stating how that responsibility should affect
the use of her theory. Having struck upon a mechanism
capable of increasing the levels of environmental pro-
tection within the constraints of the existing separa-
tion of global authority and effective power, she fails
to evaluate in detail its possible operation, Her
analysis underplays the duty of the central community
to advance norms of equality and distribution and so
underestimates the potential costs of authorizing self-
interested costbearers to enforce environmental stan-
dards. A narrow emphasis on the level of benefits may
lead to authorization in cases where the value of those
benefits is outweighed by the costs to other central
community values or where virtually the same level of
benefit could be obtained by the central community
without any authorization at all. In other words, if
authorization is looked on as a "side payment" that
costs the central community something to make, it
should only be paid when necessary. If the environmen-
tal public good would be produced regardless of author-
ization, the central community can withhold its side
payment and, in essence, become a free rider. Similar-
ly, if the side payment costs more than the central
community is willing to pay for the benefits that will
be produced, it should decline to authorize. A syste-
matic examination of possible relationships between




should demonstrate instances in which values and fac-
tors not sufficiently developed in Dr. Schneiderts
analysis would dictate that authorization be withheld.
With regard to the private production of any par-
ticular public environmental benefit, there are three
possible relationships between authorization by the
central community and the actual behavior of a cost-
bearing nation-state: First, the nation-state can act
solely according to its self-interest regardless of
the authorization or approval of the central community;
in other words, the action of the central community
will have virtually no effect on the level of the pub-
lic good produced. Second, the nation-state can, in
return for the legitimating authorization of the cen-
tral community, accept certain conditions relating to
the quantity and distribution of the public good pro-
duced. Third, the approval or authorization of the
central community can be felt to be capacitating; that
is, the state will not, without such authorization, be
abZe to provide enough of the public good to merit in,
curring the cost. 2 6
The first relationship, nation-state action inde-
pendent of central community approval or disapproval,
most closely resembles the model of public goods pro-
duction envisaged by the "small roup", exception to
the logic of collective action.2 7 Possession of the
public good is a sufficient condition for its produc-
tion. The nation-state proposing to produce an environ-
mental public good has the power, within the zone of
activity, to do so. It values the production of the
good highly enough to incur the costs of production,
convinced, for whatever reason, that if it does not do
26. The third relationship falls outside of Dr. Schneiderts
model to the extent that the authorization is substantially more
than a side payment to overcome an individual nation-state's in-
clination to weigh heavily its chances of becoming a free rider.
If authorization is somehow capacitating, then the central com-
munity has effective control and, hence, substantial bargaining
power. Moreover, because the costs of delivering the public good
will, in this instance more than the other two, fall heavily on
the central community, there is a stronger basis for expecting
direct intervention or regulation to be as economical as authori-
zation.
27. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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it, the good will not be produced. 28 The state will
produce a suboptimal amount of the good and fail to
consider the claims of other states in deciding when
the costs of producing the good exceed the benefits.
Moreover, the quantity of the public good produced will
be only negligibly, if at all, affected by the approval,
disapproval or acquiescence of the central community.
There is no need for a side payment because the cost-
bearer has forgone the opportunity to be a free rider.
Where this relationship holds, the central commu-
nity should not authorize the exercise of jurisdiction
by a costbearing nation-state. Authorization risks the
legitimacy of the central community organization in the
eyes of non-dostbearers. 2 9 Declining to authorize sac-
rifices very little, if any, of the benefit that would
otherwise have been achievable and yet reinforces the
community's legitimate commitment to equality and dis-
tributive justice. It is precisely where this excep-
tion to the collective action model most narrowly pre-
dicts the interaction that central community decision-
makers responsible for advancing normative principles
should decline to authorize. Though the central com-
munity may decline to authorize a certain activity, it
28. This is not a wholly unlikely scenario in the context
of unilateral efforts at environmental protection. A nation-state
may so intensely desire to protect some resource over which it has
sovereignty that it may, in so doing, protect resources over which
it claims neither sovereignty nor even special privilege, While
the community of nations is not particularly small, the inequali-
ties of power and asymmetries of interest among its members are
such that information on likely alternative costbearers is fre-
quently unambiguous. Consider, for example, the Canadian Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, Can. Rev. Stat. Clst
Supp.) c. 2 §§ 1-28 at 3-25. Canada probably had little expecta-
tion that any other nation would unilaterally protect the arctic
waters al-ong Canada's northern border.
29. Though it should be acknowledged that the legitimacy of
an authoritative organization may be threatened by its continued
or egregious impotence in the face of activity of which it does
not approve, here the greater danger seems to be approving the
production and distribution of a good derived from an inclusive
resource solely according to the interests of a self-interested
nation-state, This seems particularly true when, as discussed
infra, the world community has the option of acquiescing in an




need not decline to benefit from it.30 The central com-
munity, representing its constituent non-costbearing
members, may become a "free rider." The choice remains,
however, between acquiescing in and actively disapprov-
ing the individual nation-state's action.
The decision to acquiesce or disapprove, under
the conditions of this first relationship, is meaningful
only insofar as it signals the' world community's balanc-
ing of the factors of total benefit, equality and dis-
tribution. By hypothesis, neither acquiescence nor dis-
approval will significantly affect the level of the good
produced. The difference between the two is in the de-
gree of legitimacy withheld. The central community
should acquiesce in cases in which, albeit by ultimately
unacceptable means, the private action does significant-
ly contribute to the total public welfare. The choice
between acquiescence and disapproval should be based on
the amount of the public good that is made available to
non-costbearers, how much of an improvement over com-
plete non-production the situation represents, the iden-
tity of the non-costbearing beneficiaries, and how
close to an optimal level of the good is being produced.
It is conceivable that a nation-state might, without
agreeing to the conditions attendant upon authorization,
produce and distribute a public good in a way that would
in fact fulfill those conditions. 31 The objective fact
of meeting or approaching a Pareto-optimal pattern of
public good production should not, however, necessarily
result in authorization. It may be most advantageous to
the world community merely to acquiesce in the nation-
state's unilateral action. Acquiescence may not effi-
ciently enable the community to continue to capture the
benefit and not risk the consequences of either coerced
approval or impotent disapproval.3 2 If nation-state
control over an inclusive resource egregiously underpro-
duces or maldistributes the public good, the central
30. In some cases the world community cannot choose not to
benefit--the health effects of cleaner air cannot be declined. In
most cases, since it is a common or inclusive resource at stake, it
would be foolhardy to decline to benefit since one is already incur-
ring the cost. Accepting the benefit is merely capturing a fraction
of the benefit in which each nation has a legitimate interest.
31. It seems unlikely that any nation-state would produce at
this level and not agree to conditions it was already meeting. How-
ever, such a situation might arise where the nation-state placed a
very high value on its freedom unilaterally to change the levels of
the good produced or the pattern of the distribution of benefits.
32. See note 29 supra.
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community should disapprove the exercise of jurisdic-
tion.
It is only in the second possible relationship
between central community authorization and the behav-
ior of the self-interested nation-state that authoriza-
tion may be appropriate. Authorization should be limi-
ted to situations in which it can be effectively and
explicitly exchanged for concessions as to the produc-
tion and distribution of the environmental public good.
The authorizing central community and the costbearing
nation-state must agree to the scheme of public goods
production. Before making its "side payment" of author-
ization, the central community should satisfy itself
that the level of benefits, the means of their produc-
tion, and their ultimate distribution approach the opti-
mum that can be expected in the particular situation.
To remain within the model of self-interested action,
concessions will necessarily be constrained by the cost-
bearer's analysis of the amount of benefit it must cap-
ture to continue producing the public good. The cost-
bearer can be burdened only to the point at which its
cost/benefit ratio, including the benefits associated
with the central community's side payment, is just suf-
ficient to keep it producing the good.3 3 The only rea-
son to make any distributive concessions at all would
be the costbearer's placing a value on authorization
over and above the value necessary to abandon its option
to free ride. Within the constraints of the self-inter-
est model, it seems likely that only in certain situa-
tions will the value attached to authorization exceed
33. The range of bargaining within the self-interest model
will depend on a certain inelasticity in the~costbearerts demand for
a particular level of the public good. This is not, however, a
difficult condition to imagine. The value of environmental public
goods--e.g., cleaner air or water--frequently demonstrates a non-
linear relationship to costs. If air pollution levels became high
enough to have uniformly acute, population-wide health effects,
the demand for reducing pollution belov whatever threshold produces
those effects would be relatively insensitive to variations in the
marginal costs of any range of the necessary reduction. Similarly,
if one sought to repopulate acidic lakes with fish species that re-
quire a pH above 6.5 to survive, increasing the pH (reducing the
acidity) from 5.0 to 6.0 would be of no value. Regardless of whe-
ther a substantially greater price were attached to the increase
from 6.0 to 6.5 than to that from 5.0 to 6.0, the demand would be
the same (assuming that the only benefit associated with the change
in pH were the creation of a fish habitat).
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the extra cost associated with the central community's
demand for distributional considerations. The most
likely situation, given the value of central community
authorization implicit in the global distribution of ef-
fective power, would seem to be one in which the cost-
bearer would, but for the fact that the good is a "pub-
lic" or "collective" one and cannot, therefore, be cap-
tured and sold to non-costbearers, continue to produce
the good beyond the point at which its own demand was
satisfied.34 In that situation, the side payment of au-
thorization is relatively more likely to induce cost-
bearers to incur the costs of additional production, or
of effecting distributional goals. In essence, in such
a situation, the extra quantity of benefits produced or
distributed is "sold" to the central community in ex-
change for authorization, a value no individual non-
costbearer could deliver.
Although the level of benefits provided and their
distribution will be suboptimal relative to that which
might be produced by a central community with coercive
power, the exchange of authorization for affirmative
production or distributional duties is substantially
preferable to the unilateral production of an equivalent
level of public benefits. Only where exchanged for an
agreement to certain duties should coercive authority be
delegated to a self-interested nation-state. Whereas
wholly unilateral action can, for the purposes of this
discussion, be considered devoid of normative content,
an agreement between the central community and the cost-
bearing state acknowledges the authority of the central
community as well as the power of the costbearer. Pro-
duction of the public good becomes a conscious pursuit
of a more broadly defined self-interest. It recognizes
that consumers of the public good are not free riders,
that they are entitled to participate in the benefits
associated with the particular inclusive resource over
which the costbearer 5 has been granted jurisdiction.
34. This situation would be graphically illustrated by a
costbearer whose demand is satisfied at an output quantity that oc-
curs at a point at which the costbearer's marginal cost curve con-
tinues to decline. In other words, an additional unit of the good
would be less costly to produce than the last. There is no incen-
tive to continue producing a "public" good beyond this point, how-
ever, because it cannot be sold. Despite declining marginal costs,
marginal returns would be zero.
35. The costbearer should be recognized to be the pr'tncipal
but not the soZe costbearer. See note 22 supra.
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Only by insisting on agreements with these effects does
the central community exchange its valuable authoriza-
tion for benefits of equal value.
While Dr. Schneider's analysis and the allied
Canadian concepts of "custodianship" and "delegation of
powers" 3 6 acknowledge in a general way that authoriza-
tion by the central community entails responsibility on
the part of the costbearer, they do not sufficiently ac-
count for the outlines of that responsibility or the
factors that must be balanced in evaluating its fulfill-
ment. Because she focuses on levels of environmental
benefits and too completely analogizes international en-
vironmental problems to economic externalities in market
systems,3 7 thereby underestimating the normative compo-
nent of the global community's perspective, Dr. Schnei-
der's analysis would recommend delegation of authority
in situations in which the benefits of doing so are lim-
ited relative to the costs. Except in cases where the
self-interested nation-state acknowledges the inclusive
nature of the resource being exploited and, hence, the
limitations on its right to control the resource or the
destination of the benefits flowing from that resource,
the world community has no reason to delegate authorita-
tive jurisdiction. Given the asymmetry of effective
power in the world system, the situations in which au-
thorization can be exchanged for meaningfully redistri-
butive actions by self-interested states are apt to be
more limited than Dr. Schneider's analysis suggests. Ex-
cept where the establishment of a pattern or practice of
unilateral action risks developing a norm in favor of
that pattern, the world community can probably gain as
much benefit from acquiescence as from authorization.
Where benefits can be gained without authorization and
the self-interested nation-state declines to recognize
limits on its rights--situations which as an empirical
matter may be rather frequent among powerful nations38--
36. Pp. 108-25.
37. See, e.g., pp. 12-13.
38. See Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) [1974]
I.C.J. 253 and (New Zealand v. France) [1974] I.C.J. 457. These
cases fall short of declaring an international norm against atmos-
pheric testing at least in part because the United States and the
Soviet Union declined to support such a norm despite being signato-
ries to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, August 5,
1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. Their re-
fusal was at least partly linked to their desire to retain the right,
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the central community should not authorize'or legitimate
unilateral enforcement.
II. Trends in International Environmental Law
In the course of developing its principal theore-
tical framework, World publ-ic order of the environment
identifies two important themes in international envi-
ronmental decisionmaking: the tension between developed
and developing countries and the emergence of "function-
al" or "zonal" criteria in defining and allocating in-
clusive resources. The first is more important to the
field, Indeed, environmental protection can be viewed
simply as a component of the larger problem of diver-
gence between the interests of developed and developing
nations. Nonetheless, the area of international environ-
mental policy represents an especially clear illustra-
tion of an important aspect of the conflict: Developed
nations seek to preserve remaining environmental ameni-
ties and conserve resources threatened by their historic
and current rapaciousness. They pursue environmental
quality through the application of sophisticated and fre-
quently expensive technology. Developing countries per-
ceive environmental problems but frequently, and often
justifiably, subordinate their concern about such prob-
lems to issues of economic development and the basic ma-
terial welfare of their populations.
Without pretending to resolve it, Dr. Schneider
captures the tension between developed and developing
worlds in a way that demonstrates understanding of both
positions. Starting from a premise that "[tihe funda-
mental goal ... is fairness or social justice of some
sort," 39 she nonetheless acknowledges that "the concept
of fairness or justice is itself a mixed goal, ''40 which
"although largely indefinable by any empirical methods ...
38. (Continued)
written into the treaty, to escape its jurisdiction under certain
specified conditions. Declaration of an international norm would
provide no such "escape hatch." If this attitude toward liunita-
tions on national autonomy persists, individual nation-states capable
of producing public goods out of self-interest will be reluctant, at
least for the foreseeable future, to accept meaningful limitations on
their autonomy by formally acknowledging that the public goods being
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is recognizable at least in its absence.'" 41 Because in-
stances of such injustice are so frequent, the world
community cannot ignore them and must concentrate on
the "objective goals of reducing the costs of resource
use by the global community."4 2
While this "objective" formulation may reasonably
operationalize aspirations in both the developed and
developing spheres, it does not begin to allocate the
costs of implementation. The tension between those na-
tions which suffer principally from the "pollution of
poverty"43 and those which are now paying the price for
having "fouled their own nests" is largely over who will
bear the costs of solving those problems. If, as has
been tacitly acknowledged,4 4 the costs of both environ-
mental cleanup and integrating environmental protection
measures into development planning are to be borne by
the developed countries,4 5 there will have to be some
incentive to do so. It is in recognition of the need to
act that Dr. Schneider develops her theory of environ-
mental protection by delegating authority to self-in-
terested nations and observes the evolution of "function-
al" and "zonal" criteria for defining and allocating re-
sources.
Dr. Schneider identifies a trend away from unilat-
eral assertions of control over entire geographic areas
or resources. Such "resource-specific" claims are being





44. In its Declaration on the Human Environment, The Stock-
holm Conference stated:
In the developing countries most of the environmental problems
are caused by underdevelopment.... Therefore, the developing
countries must direct their efforts to develop, bearing in
mind their priorities and the need to safeguard and improve
the environment. For the same purpose, the industrialized
countries should make efforts to reduce the gap between them-
selves and the developing countries,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
[hereinafter cited as The Stockholm Declaration], in Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14 at 2 (1972).
45. P. 70 citing Principle 12 of The Stockholm Declaration,




Instead of dealing with the oceans and other
resources en bloc or as total physical media
to be carved up geographically, ... the
trend is increasingly toward treating these
resources as bundles of multiple potential
uses, some of which are separable for deci-
sionmaking purposes. The real function of
the zonal concept, therefore, can be seen as
serving as a safety valve from the rigidi-
ties of line-drawing by boundaries of terri-
torial 'sovereignty'...: it permits the satis-
faction of particular reasonable demands
through exercise of limited authority and
control which does not endanger the whole
gamut of inclusive community interests.4 7
The division of inclusive resources into reasona-
bly discrete functional segments may provide the central
community with greater leverage over individual nation-
states. Where the resource is widely acknowledged to be
inclusive and, hence, legitimately controlled by the
central community, division into separate components
will give the central community more flexibility in the
side payments it can make or withhold. Authorization of
specific functions would free the central community from
the choice between granting exclusive jurisdiction over
an entire geographic area or not authorizing at all. In-
stead, it could authorize the costbearer to exercise ex-
clusive or dispr.oportionately advantageous jurisdiction
over one component of a resource and, in turn, require
the costbearer to develop or protect remaining aspects
or functional components of the inclusive resource to
the advantage of the entire world community. For in-
stance, rather than permitting coastal states to assume
complete jurisdiction over the adjoining ocean in order
that they be able to enforce oil pollution standards,
the central community might grant jurisdiction over
dumping and spills by surface shipping within a certain
zone and might even license the costbearing state to
specify certain design features of vessels traversing
the zone.4 8 Thus, the world community could authorize
the coastal state to promulgate and enforce standards to
protect its own shoreline that would admittedly infringe
47. Id.
48. See p. 112. Dr. Schneider, however, states that design
specification is currently seen as an excessive interference with
traditional values of the freedom of navigation,
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the traditional scope of freedom of navigation but
would also protect the biological integrity of the
ocean zone by preventing dumping or spilling. The in-
clusive resource, the ocean beyond the coastal state's
territorial waters, would be protected from biological
degradation without sacrificing the entire range of
freedoms of navigation.
As intriguing and, indeed, useful as these sug-
gestions may be, the concept of functional division of
resources does not fully solve the problems, discussed
above, 4 9 implicit in producing public goods through
self-interested action. First, the central community
must be recognized to have original jurisdiction over
the resource in question for it effectively to make trade-
offs between different functions and to delegate compe-
tencies over them. Since the central community has no
monopoly over information or the ability to conceptualize
a resource in terms of its functionally severable
characteristics, there seems little reason, in the
absence of general recognition that each aspect of the
resource is inclusive, for the self-interested state not
to identify the particular function in which its private
interest lies and limit its activities to that function.
Before side payments can be made in terms of functional
jurisdiction, the central community must have recognized
and effective jurisdiction over the resources in question.
The zonal or functional concept may, however, be
useful where different functional aspects of a resource
are differentially acknowledged to be legitimately with-
in the jurisdiction of the central community. In such
cases, the recognized international jurisdiction over
one component may provide the central community with
bargaining power vis-a-vis the self-interested state and
may suffice to elicit acceptable terms for authoriza-
tion. Enforcing marine pollution standards by author-
izing coastal states to exercise some degree of juris-
diction over the widely acknowledged right of free navi-
gation may well exemplify just such a trade-off. Cen-
tral community jurisdiction over the freedom of naviga-
tion is more strongly established than its claimed juris-
diction over marine pollution. Both values represent
components of a broader inclusive resource: the oceans.
A side payment to costbearing coastal states allowing
them, in the course of enforcing marine pollution stan-
49. See Part I, supra.
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dards, to infringe limited aspects of the freedom of
navigation could have tremendous cost-saving implica-
tions. The "side payment" would represent a substantive
contribution to the cost of enforcing the pollution
standards. A side payment limited to authorizing the
coastal state to enforce pollution standards might well
produce a lower level of benefits, because the individu-
al nation-state would face a higher cost schedule.
As the example suggests, the use of functional and
zonal criteria in instances where the central community
can bring its effective jurisdiction to bear may in-
crease both the scope and flexibility of its bargaining
power. These observations do not, however, vitiate the
point that unilateral enforcement action should not be
authorized unless in exchange for real concessions from
the self-interested nation-state.
Conclusion
World public order of the environment offers valu-
able first steps toward collecting, organizing, and
analyzing the mass of information that constitutes the
basis for international environmental standards and ex-
pectations. The book acknowledges from the outset that
its purpose is to suggest how better to protect and en-
hance environmental values within the constraints of the
current global situation, The value of Dr. Schneider's
suggestions is only marginally diminished by their fail-
ure to provide complete solutions. More complete resolu-
tion of international environmental problems may require
nation-states to recognize that increasing interdepend-
ence necessarily affects the definition of sovereignty.
While the present global system offers no imminent pros-
pect of significant change in the patterns of sovereign
power, the environmental consequences of unilateral cal-
culations of welfare maximization continue to accumulate.
Used cautiously, Dr. Schneider's attempt to enlist self-
interested sovereigns into the service of global welfare
goals is, in the absence of a central authority with ef-
fective power, a most promising approach to environmental
policy.
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